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a sentient being. The indestructibility of matter is really a statement of the constancy of certain sensations. Materialism thus needs simply to be led to reflect. It does not stand to idealism as a rival philosophy, but is simply a *naïve*, uncritical way of thinking, while idealism, if true, *is* philosophy—philosophy being (as I use it now) no more than thought cleared of obscurity and assumption.¹ The only charge against materialism is, that it cannot be finally stated save in terms of idealism; and hence it may itself become idealism if it will but abandon the school-boy "cocksureness"² which is too apt to characterize it, and proceed to the not always welcome task of self-examination.

BRADLEY'S "PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC."*

BY S. W. DYDE.

(Continued.)

a. Bradley states (p. 10) that "judgment proper is the act which refers an ideal content (*recognized as such*) to a reality beyond the act"; again (p. 2): "Not only are we unable to judge before we use ideas, but, strictly speaking, *we cannot judge till we use them as ideas*. We must have become aware that they are not realities, that they are mere ideas, signs of an existence other than themselves"; and again (p. 40): "*The consciousness of objectivity* or necessary connection, in which the essence of judgment is sometimes taken to lie, will be found in the end to derive its meaning from a reference to the real." These three remarks all emphasize the same thought. To recognize an ideal content as such is the affirmative way of saying to be aware that it is not a reality; while again, when it is said that the consciousness of objectivity is the essence of judgment, it is meant that judgment in its essence does not consist so much in the mere relation of ideal content to

¹ I do not presume to give this as a definition of philosophy.

² Professor Huxley.

* "The Principles of Logic." By F. H. Bradley, LL. D., Glasgow, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. London: Kegan Paul & Co., Paternoster Square.

reality as in the knowledge that the relation so made is an act of judgment.

In order fully to comprehend the above statements, we must discover the exact significance of "ideal content," the exact meaning of "reality," and also what is implied in the assertion that such reality exists independent of the act. First of all, What is the ideal content? In everything which we know exists we can distinguish at least two sides—(1) existence, (2) content. Even in the most simple proposition, "This is," for example, is already implied more than mere existence; for in our saying *This* is, we have given it, whatever it is, a position in space. Also when we fail to discover the content of a presentation and ask, "What is that?" there is already implied that it is, and that it is there. The content may be simple or it may be complex, but all that is has a content of some kind. A flower exists and has its peculiar qualities. These qualities, which form the content of the flower, can be discovered on examination. It is of a particular color, has a particular smell, has a certain number of petals, etc., belongs to such and such an order of plant. But we shall examine in vain if we expect to discover anything which will not come under the head of content. And yet some flowers stand for their own kind and some have attached to them a meaning. This meaning is not in the flower but in our heads. What is in the flower is real. What is in our heads is ideal. Thus we have two different aspects of everything: (a) The aspect of perception or presentation, which gives us the object as unique or individual, and (b) the aspect of thought, which gives us the object in its meaning or in its idea as a universal or a representative.

We may discover the exact significance of "ideal content" in another way, by an attention to the different senses of "idea." We may take, as an instance, any common perception, *e. g.*, that of a horse, of a particular horse which I had once seen and known. When my mind is turned toward this object, in all likelihood I recall in imagination some particular scene in which the animal played a prominent part. A picture is before me. I fancy I see the whole surroundings as well as the arch of his neck, the color of his hair, his prancing to and fro and round and round. This is a mental image, and it is particular. Such an image holds good of only one horse in the universe and of one particular occasion.

That picture will suit no other animal. Such is an idea, when idea means my psychical state. But now I abstract from this living, substantial scene all such attributes as we know are necessary to describe a horse. This particular horse vanishes. No position, no color, no special size or shape now appear. What is left is an idea—my idea of horse, idea now in the sense of meaning or logical idea. This idea (of a horse) never finds a counterpart in the actual world, but is a wandering adjective, having an existence only in our heads. The meaning of reality will be discussed hereafter.

The main question now to be asked is, What is the meaning of the phrase in parenthesis, "recognized as such"? Already we have given Bradley's own explanation. He further says (p. 10): "The ideal content is recognized as such when we know that by itself it is not a fact but a wandering adjective." I conceive that the writer means, primarily, by all these phrases, that judgment implies consciousness, *i. e.*, you cannot judge unless your mind is at work. It further calls attention to the truth that in judgment is a distinction between subject and object. If there were no such distinction there would be neither judgment nor idea. Only when we recognize that we are not the objects we see and touch are we able to judge. It may be that our knowledge of self is little, and that little of a negative character, yet it is, so far, a true knowledge of self. The child only becomes self-conscious when it distinguishes itself from the things which surround it. Until that is done, the child is only one object among others. When that is done, the pulse of thought begins to beat and the child judges. But while this is true, and will be admitted by every one, yet Bradley has put the position so strongly that it looks suspicious. There seems to underlie the phrase "recognized as such" a meaning which, when expounded, will prove the opposite of true. It is stated that we positively cannot judge unless we explicitly recognize that the ideal content is a *mere* idea and is not reality; *i. e.*, we contrast sharply ideal content and reality. When that has been done we are in a position to judge. In Chapter II, Bradley states that exclamations are nearly always judgments. "Fire!" "Wolf!" etc., are judgments. Nay, more, the pointing of the finger, the wink of the eye, are likewise judgments. But many who cry "Fire!" many who wink the eye, are so far from recog-

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nizing explicitly the separation of ideal content and reality that they could not for the life of them tell if there were such a thing in existence as ideal content. But it may be answered that these have the capacity to understand that the ideal content is not reality when the matter is set before them. The answer is, But there you desert your own post. It was your theory that the ideal content must be *recognized as such*, that one could not judge unless he were able to say, "I am now about to refer an ideal content to a reality." If this were true, finally, what a comprehension a dog must possess when he judges, "What is smells"! But we may maintain, in opposition to the above, that all thinking, however vague, however indefinite, just so far as it is thinking, is also judging. The only difference between thinking and judging is, that judging is the expressing or stating of the thought, clothing it in words, thinking aloud. When a child places its hand upon a book and cries "Book," in its broken English, it as truly judges as the man who says "This is Volume I. of Macaulay's 'History of England,'" or as the philosopher who has written a book on ideal contents. It is only by analysis that we come to discover what judgment truly is—or would Bradley say that all philosophers who had not a true theory of judgment were unable to judge at all? Further, in order to know reality, to know ideal content, and to know a distinction between the two, we must have made many judgments, inasmuch as all this is knowledge, and to know is to judge. So that, if we still maintain that we *cannot* judge before we recognize the ideal content as such, and reality as such, we would conclude that we have judged before we could judge, or that, inasmuch as we could not know ideal content or reality without judging, we were wholly unable to recognize any distinction between them, or, in fact, were wholly unable to know anything at all. In the judgment is the synthesis of ideal content and reality, and this is discovered only after elaborate analysis.

Bradley, it may now be seen, has in the above failed to distinguish accurately between two very different things—viz.: the explicit and implicit presence of a logical principle. No one will accuse him of not seeing at all the difference between these two, for his own words would be a sufficient answer to such an accusation. When a street urchin cries "Fire!" he has judged, and it is just as true a judgment in one sense, Bradley would admit, as if

uttered by a logician who was aware of what was implied in the interjection. Yet, if this were taken without qualification, the reason for the insertion of the phrase "recognized as such" would have disappeared. He would think that, while the exclamation of the street urchin was, equally with that of the logician, a judgment, yet something radical was wanting in the former that was supplied in the latter. All that is absent in the one and present in the other is the consciousness of the logical significance of the phrase. This would seem to indicate that it would be possible for the consciousness of the logical significance to be so far wanting that the words would cease to be a judgment.

The difficulty may be put in another form. There is before us an elementary judgment. He who has judged, it may be, was ignorant that it was a judgment. The logician takes this judgment, and, analyzing, finds an ideal content, and a reality, and a referring to the reality of the ideal content. He is apt, therefore, to consider the judgment enriched by that process, and to think that, because the full meaning of the assertion was not before understood, the assertion itself has undergone a change. It is tempting to transfer the process of an analysis (which must from its very nature be a conscious one) to the assertion analyzed, and then to maintain that after the analysis something is to be found in the assertion that was not there before the analysis. It is the cropping up of the insidious belief that our thinking is one with universal thought. If it were true that our analyzing absolutely added to the idea, the conclusion would be forced upon us that, could we go back sufficiently far, we should come upon the foundation on which our process was primarily built, and that this foundation could not possibly be analyzed, and was, therefore, unknowable. Of course, Bradley nowhere states that such a conclusion is held by him; but this is manifestly the tendency of the theory.

b. The next point to be considered is the division of the Singular Judgments into (1) Analytic Judgments of Sense in which the given is alone analyzed. (2) Synthetic Judgments of Sense which transcend the given. (3) Those which have to do with a reality which is never an event in time (p. 48). It will be necessary, first of all, to understand what Bradley means by these terms.

1. Analytic Judgments of Sense. As judgment is the reference

of an ideal content to reality, then wherever that reference is found, if this theory adequately describes judgment, there is also judgment. In the first class of analytic judgments the reference is not expressly stated, but is yet certainly there. The subject, here unexpressed, may be (*a*) the whole sensible reality, or (*b*) a portion of it only. An example of (*a*) is "Wolf." Now, what have we in the assertion "Wolf"? Every one will admit that its meaning is that present to sight, or it may be to hearing, is the animal in question. Therefore we may say that we qualify the sensible present, the external, visible prospect by the adjective "wolf." Some have objected that, as single words are often interjections, no judgment is implied in them. We can only answer that, as single words can all be resolved into their meaning—and not only can be, but as a matter of fact are, for the very reason that they must be possessed of a meaning—they must also contain a judgment. An example of (*b*) is found when bending over a couch we should say of its occupant, "Asleep." In that case we do not refer to the bed or couch, or the covering, although all these may be present, but only to the person—*i. e.*, to a portion only of the sensible reality. In the second class of analytic judgments a subject is expressed. The ideal content is referred to the reality through an idea. The ideal content may be referred (*a*) to the whole or (*b*) to a part of what appears. Examples of (*a*) are: "Now is the time" and "The present is dark"; and of (*b*): "This is a bird" and "Here is a fish."

The analytic judgment has for its logical subject the external present, or a portion of the external present expressed or understood. The "external present" has no reference, when we say "external," to a reality beyond consciousness, nor any reference, when we say "present," to something which is not in time. "External present" takes its real significance from a reference to the spatial and temporal position of the speaker, and means that which is visibly or tangibly before me while I am in such and such a place or time, or such and such a condition. When the place, time, or condition in which I am is changed, the external present changes with it. "The present is dark," *e. g.*, is only true while I am in a dark place. "Now is the time" is only true of the particular time in which I am. And, again, though I exclaim "Miserable" as I look upon a picture of squalor and wretchedness, that is only

true for me while I am above that state myself, or am in my present condition.

A synthetic judgment, on the other hand, makes an assertion about something that we do not perceive, touch, etc.—*i. e.*, about something which does appear in our space and time, as was hinted at above. *Our* space and time is not fixed and invariable. It may be an hour, it may be a day; that altogether depends upon the character of the judgment. But whatever the space, how large or how small, and whatever the time, how long or how short, so long as it is not *our* space and time, it is not analytic. *E. g.*, the judgment, "The cow which is now being milked by the milkmaid is standing to the right of the hawthorn-tree yonder," would be analytic though the cow, milkmaid, and tree were half a mile off—or, indeed, so long as we could behold the operation of milking—while on the other hand the judgment, "There is a garden on the other side of the wall," would be still synthetic though I could touch the wall with my finger; and so with the others. This is the main distinction. The distinction of Analytic and Synthetic will not hold true on examination if the words really mean analytic and synthetic. Bradley says: "In 'John is asleep' the ultimate subject cannot be real as it is now given, for 'John' implies a continuous existence, not got by mere analysis." We might with equal truth say the same of the subject of any judgment. Nothing is got by mere analysis at all. With the analysis there must be also synthesis. So that every judgment is both analytic and synthetic. Consequently, as has already been stated, the main distinction must be that the analytic judgment has to do with *my* space, *my* time, *my* condition—as I now am—which "now" may be longer or shorter, as the case may be, while the synthetic judgment has to do with what is not *my* space, *my* time, *my* condition—as I now am—but with what might be or has been *my* space, *my* time, or *my* condition under other circumstances.

It now devolves upon us to discover the reasons Bradley has for drawing the above distinctions between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments. In the first place, it cannot be that the former refers the ideal content to the sensible present and the latter to an idea, for Bradley has himself said that synthetic judgments likewise refer to the external present, but in this case through an idea.

But, again, it cannot be that the latter refers indirectly to the external present while the former refers to it directly. No doubt, when I cry "Wolf!" I surely qualify the present by the adjective "wolf." Yet when I use the cry, if I have eyesight, I will not gaze up into the clouds, or on the ground at my feet, but will at least look toward the animal, if not point eagerly in its direction. Now that fact, though unexpressed, is surely present in the exclamation "Wolf!" If so, what results? This, at least: that the present to which the adjective is referred is not a vague, undefined present like a desert waste. We are, in fact, referring to a particular portion of it. No judgment, not even the most elementary, refers any ideal content to a sensible present, if we mean by "sensible present" a present that cannot be further defined. In every judgment is implied particularity as to time and space. Accordingly, as particularity with regard to time and space involves many references, the sensible present has already many references implicit in it, and is therefore, to all intents and purposes, an idea. We have already shown that when we cry "Wolf!" we do not mean "in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth," but a wolf right there. That is implied by some gesture or other which is properly embraced within the meaning of the judgment. The gesture stands for words. We can see, too, that when we cry "Wolf!" we mean the wolf that I now see, or it may be now hear. We have, then, reference to a particular time. All this is fairly and legitimately implied in the expression. Therefore, it follows that what seems a "visible external present" is much more than what it seems—and is in reality a complicated idea.

It seems evident, then, that the difference between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments does not consist in the one's referring to a sensation and the other to an idea, for both refer to the external present. Nor was it, again, in one's referring directly and the other indirectly to the external present, since both refer indirectly, for, even in the case where no grammatical subject is expressed, one is implied, which is not adequately described as a part of the external present, but is only understood when seen to be an idea. The only valid distinction seems to be with regard to the degree of expressed or implied complexity. The Analytic Judgment is satisfied with the space included within the range of vision and

with the present time ; the Synthetic Judgment deals with a space not now within our range of vision and a time not now present. This is certainly a distinction. But it is hard to discover why that distinction should make judgments of higher and lower grades. There is no faculty called into play by the Synthetic Judgment that has not been previously called into play by the Analytic. To connect a space not seen with the space seen is no doubt a synthesis. But to know the space seen equally requires synthesis. It is the same with time. To connect to-day with yesterday is a work of synthesis. But there is a synthesis necessary in order to know the smallest moment of time. An atomic here or there is as unknowable as an atomic now or then. But the whole question of the separation between Analysis and Synthesis (if these terms are employed by Bradley now in the same sense as they are employed afterward) must rest for its support upon the validity of an atomic here and an atomic now. If there is no such thing, then everything that implies Analysis at once implies Synthesis. When it is seen that the external present, to which the ideal content is referred in the Analytic Judgments, consists of temporal and spatial relations, then the Analytic Judgment becomes Synthetic. Every judgment is both or else neither. We need no magnifying-glass to see the tendency of the theory. The atomic then and now are inscrutable, and so unknowable, and we are landed where we were before.

It may be objected that Bradley would agree with all this, and has already expressed himself against the fiction of an atomic moment of time and portion of space. This is, no doubt, true. It only shows that he would hardly take arms against his own theory, and that he has not pushed his own views to their logical issue. Again, it may be answered that Bradley does not mean by analytic and synthetic what is ordinarily understood by these words. The reply is that, no matter how little he may mean by them, even if they are looked upon only as convenient names, yet it shows (apart from the fact that names should be appropriate) that he had not quite liberated himself from the thralldom of terms.

There is abundance of room for discussion in Bradley's introduction of the word "inference" into the explanation of the Analytic and Synthetic Judgments. He says of the latter (p. 48):

"They are synthetic because they extend the given through an ideal construction, and they all, as we shall see, involve an inference"; and again (p. 61): "In synthetic judgments there is always an inference, for an ideal content is connected with the sensible qualities that are given us. In other words, we have always a construction which depends on ideas, and which only indirectly is based on perception." These remarks reveal Bradley's theory of inference; but that is not the point of interest at present. What is now of concern is that he seems to imply that there is no inference in the analytic judgment. He, that is, reasserts that in these latter judgments the ideal content is referred directly to the reality without any ideal construction. We have already been at pains to show that even in the most elementary analytic judgment an ideal construction was to be found. It was seen that in the cry "Wolf!" the ideal content was not in any sense hurled into or at the sensible reality, with an utter disregard of everything. Bradley saw but only dimly that "external present" could not remain empty if it were an external present for consciousness. But, if that truth had been quite apparent to him, he would have at once admitted inference into the analytic judgment. That he did not do so will be a sufficient reason for imagining, at least, that he fancied the external present of the analytic judgment to be something without form and void; and that is, after all, only the unknowable or the substrate in another form.

c. Admittedly, the most difficult portion of the first book is the consideration of the definition of judgment, in connection with which Bradley introduces his distinction between "Thisness" and "This." Fairly to appreciate his theory and properly to comprehend the meaning of the above terms, it will be necessary to go some little way about. (1.) An inquiry may first of all be instituted with regard to the meaning of these terms. When it is said judgment is the referring of an ideal content to reality, it is meant by "reality" or the "real" that which is presented, given, or that which is unique or singular—guarding, however, against the fallacy that "presented," or "given," or "unique" is exhausted in the word "Sensation." We will perceive the true signification of unique by gradually closing ourselves in. (a) The unique is not an idea. Ideas are always universals, and dealing with them we never touch ground. (b) The unique is not exhausted when it is

said to occupy a particular space or a particular time. It is not its position either in space or time that constitutes its uniqueness. A particular space or time has meaning only in relation to other spaces and times, and such a relation that, when we say "particular," we, at least, indirectly include all the others. (c) The unique is just what is left when you abstract the idea, and when you abstract the spatial and temporal position. "It is unique not because it has a certain character, but because it *is given*. It is by *reference* of our series to the real as it appears directly within this point of contact, or indirectly in the element, continuous with this point, that these series *become exclusive*." We have in the above explanation the meaning of the terms "thisness" and "this." That which is in the presentation, but, although in the presentation (*e. g.*, spatial and temporal position), does not constitute it as unique, may be called "thisness." That which, in the presentation, on the other hand, does constitute uniqueness, may be called "this." So that every possible phenomenon is in its essence "this," and has "thisness."

(2.) The object of this theory is to overthrow, finally, the belief that judgment is the synthesis of ideas, for if it can be established that every presentation has "thisness," and is "this," and the "this" is different from ideas of the ordinary kind, then judgment does, in its essence, reach reality.

(3.) A brief outline of this theory may now be given. Let us repeat, "Every possible phenomenon that can be present both is 'this' and has 'thisness.'" A black coat is a possible phenomenon. This coat has a particular shape, and so occupies a particular space. As it is a particular space, it is related to other spaces, not, it may be, directly, but indirectly through other things (coats, or not coats, it makes no difference). It also has its place in time. But, again, the coat has parts: sleeves, collar, cuffs, pockets, etc., all of which occupy spaces. These are all related to one another and to the coat, and may be called its internal relations in space and time. Again, in the way of intensity, the color "black" has degrees; and other relations are established from this aspect. All these relations combined would constitute the "thisness" of the coat. But all these relations exist, though I do not perceive the article of clothing at all. In other words, we may and do have ideas of objects without their being presented to sense. But

should the coat be present to sense, then something more than we have already mentioned would be necessary in order to fix it as presented. This something more is just that which conducts us out of the realm of the ideal or the imaginative, as the case may be, and places us in contact with reality. "It is the *sign* of my immediate relation, my direct encounter in sensible presentation with the real world." It is the "this," that other aspect of the thing presented, which makes it unique.

But an objection may now be urged, Bradley continues, against this position. The objector might argue in some such way as this: "I am willing to admit all you have said, but I want to bring into prominence one portion of your exposition, upon which you but slightly touched. Granted, let it be that your account of 'thisness' is correct. I wish to notice that you say with reference to the other aspect, that this something more, this 'this,' is but the sign of your direct encounter with the sensible world. You have already admitted that 'thisness' is but an idea; and now, when you call the 'this' a *sign*, it makes no difference of what, you have made the second aspect an idea too. For what is the idea but a sign? or what is a sign but an idea?" Bradley at once sees the force of the objection, and acknowledges that, if such be the case, we have not as yet reached reality, and our labor has been in vain. But just when it seems as if there were no way out of the difficulty, an opening is discovered in the peculiar character of the idea which is the sign of our direct encounter with the real world. This idea is such that it cannot be transferred away from itself to anything else without at the same time destroying itself. The idea "this," together with the ideas "my," "thy," etc., are peculiar and unlike any other idea whatsoever. Let us take any feeling at all, *e. g.*, the sensation of whiteness. We will overlook altogether its position in space and time (if sensation can have such position); we will also overlook the fact that it is whiteness, and attend only to the fact of its immediate presence. We have, then, the idea of immediate contact with the real world *at this particular point*. This idea of immediate contact is so an adjective—*i. e.*, an idea. Can we, now having the idea, transfer it to any other presentation? If so, then (*a*) either the given is gone, and a new given takes its place, in which case there is no transfer, for the idea of the first given has disappeared, or (*b*) the given was not the

given, for there cannot possibly be two different givens—*i. e.*, we mistook a part for the whole. In other words, again, no transfer is made, for, on the appearance of the new and larger given, the idea of the old one as unique is gone. Accordingly, *the idea* of immediate contact and immediate contact cannot be separated. To separate one from the other is to destroy both. Therefore we find that though we have "thisness" along with the idea of direct encounter with the real world, yet this latter idea is in such union with the real world that the bond is indissoluble. To put the matter in another light—we have the sign of a direct encounter with the real world in the idea "this." This constitutes the uniqueness of the idea, fancy, feeling, sensation, or whatever it happens to be. If it could be referred to another substantive, then there would be two unique presentations, which is plainly impossible; for, if there are two, they cannot both be unique. Further, if there are two, it would seem that neither could be unique. If either could be unique, then the first or the second would require to vanish. If one vanished, there would remain but a single substantive, and the attempt to enlarge our knowledge would result in endless failure. Paragraphs 25 and 26 are very hard to understand, but, if I understand them, the above is an analysis of their content. The whole theory concerning judgment, indeed it may be the whole book, stands or falls by the soundness or unsoundness of this portion of it. Accordingly, it will have to be well and carefully examined before we proceed further.

(1.) Bradley says that "this" is unique not because it has a certain character, but because it is given, or presented; because I directly encounter it in the real world. Now, we should be precise. Either we mean this, or we do not mean it. Bradley evidently means it here. But he does not seem to see the full force of what he says, for he contradicts this statement in other places. For notice: I have before me now a book. It is presented to sense, to sight, and touch. It is thus given. Now, you ask me to describe the book, and I begin to tell you its shape, size, color, contents, etc. This is, we may say, the character of the book. This, therefore, falls within its content, and is the "thisness" of the book. But we are still in the region of ideas. We have not yet got to the reality of the book, and you bid me go on. I look at it again. I feel it. I taste it. I smell it. I try in every possible way to get further

information concerning it, but I am told at every turn that I have not as yet got to the "this" of the book. I give up. I know nothing more. When lo! I am told that its reality consists in its being present to sense. The magic medium is the sense. Now, what does this mean? Plainly that, if I am unable to touch reality through any description and examination, the reality is indescribable and inscrutable. Surely the conclusion is plain. No other course is open. We find, in truth, that there is no reality at all.

(2.) Again, there is no need to enter into the discussion of what is given to thought and what is given by thought. We need not stay to show the great mistake in Kant's philosophy here. But surely we must take a rational meaning of words, and when Bradley says that reality is reached in the given and presented, although he is careful likewise to say that this given is not immediate momentary presentation, yet that is really all that can be taken out of them. He would have us believe, if he could, that there are two kinds of sensation—one a momentary, one a lasting sensation. The momentary sensation *per se* plays no part in judgment. The lasting sensation is reality. We would at once subscribe to this view. But then Bradley goes on to say that from the lasting sensation must be stripped all that makes it lasting, for that which makes a lasting sensation lasting falls under the head of content—*i. e.*, of "thisness"—and then the remainder is the reality. In this he abandons his own position. For the lasting sensation, so stripped and denuded, is and can be nothing else but the old momentary sensation in a new dress. Thus it appears that in this account of "thisness" and "this" Bradley has made sensation the touchstone of reality. Bradley has himself at considerable length refuted this theory, and we can do nothing better than refer him to his own self.

(3.) It seems that the fundamental mistake of Bradley lies in his talking of what are merely aspects of one thing, as if they were each and all separate and independent. For example: No one will disagree with our author when he says every possible phenomenon is this and has thisness. We think he is announcing an important truth—this truth, *viz.*: that every thing in consciousness is that thing for and because of consciousness. We mean by that, that when we say *every thing* in consciousness is *that thing*, we

emphasize the truth that that thing is a *particular thing*. When we say that it is that thing for and *through consciousness*, we mean that, while it is that particular thing, it is not, and cannot be, *only* that particular thing—*i. e.*, an independent thing without relations ; or, in other words, every idea, every fancy, every sensation even, has the particular and universal aspect. The idea and the sensation are *my* idea and *my* sensation ; again, they are my *idea*, my *sensation*. By which we show that they are related to the self (and so are within the consciousness of that self) and to each other. In so far as the sensation exists for my *consciousness* it is universal ; in so far as it exists for *my* consciousness it is particular. Every sensation that exists for *us* is referred to the self, and is so a thought sensation. In so far as it is a *thought* sensation it is universal ; in so far as it is a thought *sensation* it is particular. Thus we see the two aspects in everything that is, the particular and the universal element. One element due to the thought—the other to the sensation. We might also say, though not required for the present purpose, that it must have both elements. Either element apart is of no avail. While, however, insisting upon the universal and particular aspects in every object of knowledge, we would be careful to guard ourselves against making either aspect an independent existence. Now, Bradley says every possible phenomenon is "this" and has "thisness." If he means that in every possible object of knowledge we have the universal and particular aspects, good and well. But whether or no he means this, he either departs from it, or is exceeding loose and inaccurate in his statements. For we find him talking of the universal aspect (*i. e.*, thisness) as if it were itself an idea ; and we find him talking of the particular aspect (*i. e.*, this) as if it also were an independent idea—forgetting that "thisness" *per se* or "this" *per se* is equally nothing. It is one thing to have a correct and full *idea of* a universal or a particular aspect of an idea, and quite another thing to make either the universal or particular aspect of an idea itself *an idea*. Bradley, it would seem, confounds these two, and seems to think that, because we have *an idea of* a universal aspect, that aspect is *itself an idea*. Therefore we find him wondering, when he discovers that "thisness" is an idea merely, where on earth or in the principles of logic he can get at reality. Therefore, also, we find him, when he calls "this" also an idea, saving himself from

the enemy, in the shape of judgment being a synthesis of ideas, by declaring that the idea "this" is strangely peculiar, and has in some wonderful way reality wrapped up in itself. That also was the loop-hole out of which he escaped from the fallacy of an infinite series.

(4.) But following his theory to its logical conclusion, it is just this infinite series that stares us in the face. In the idea "this," or in every possible phenomenon (sensation included), we have two aspects—"thisness" and "this." Presently these aspects become ideas. Therefore, in every possible phenomenon (sensation included), we have two ideas. One of these, "thisness," we need not touch. The other is interesting. "This" = idea of immediate contact. So here in this other we have immediate contact and the idea of immediate contact. These in turn become two, etc., etc. They multiply faster than the heads of the Hydra.

(5.) We may see Bradley's difficulty in another light. He had got possession of the theory that the idea "this" (*i. e.*, of immediate encounter with the sensible world) was, in some sense, along with a few other ideas, different from all the rest. These few ideas had this peculiarity, that they could not be separated from reality. To attempt to separate the idea from the reality was to destroy the idea or the reality, or both together. Therefore, inasmuch as we know we have the idea (we could not well deny the fact without making use of the idea), we consequently know equally well that we have the reality. This, I think, is a mistake, *i. e.*, it is a mistake to suppose that reality is indissolubly bound up with only a few ideas. Bradley uses the argument we have already stated of the given being altered or else totally disappearing if we attempt to apply the idea of immediate contact to any other given than given No. I. What does this mean in plain language? I have a pencil here upon the table. I may touch it or I may not, as I call it this pencil. A book is also beside me. I may call it this book. But if I call it this book, then the idea "this" which I used in the case of the pencil (the idea this = idea of immediate contact) is either destroyed or else the given (*i. e.*, the pencil) disappears, or is submerged in a larger given, which includes pencil and book. Underneath all this is the fallacy not only that the real is the presented (which with care might be shown to be true enough, or rather that the presented is real), but

that the real is real only while it is presented. I cannot understand Bradley when he talks of the idea "this" being destroyed when I look from the pencil to the book. I say "this pencil," I say "this book." The idea (if you like to call it an idea) of immediate contact is present in both cases, and is destroyed by neither. This fallacy that the real is only real while it is presented has grown out of the false meaning which he has attached to "unique." If "unique" mean out of relation altogether, perfectly simple and immediate, it is easily seen how that, having looked at "this pencil" and having turned to "this book," I have destroyed the unique. If, indeed, the given is unique in this sense, then all will agree with Bradley. But many will wish to go further and say that even before they turn from the pencil to the book—with even looking at the pencil—the unique was destroyed, for the unique *per se* is nothing whatsoever. Is the idea "this," when placed equal to idea of direct encounter with the sensible world, unique? Far from it. Is there not implied in direct *encounter* (granted that it is an idea, although we fail to understand how it is) something to encounter (Bradley would have to admit some *one* to encounter) and something to be encountered? There must also be present the "ego" to comprehend them both. In the idea of direct encounter is there not also implied the time-filling which is the characteristic of sensation? Sensation, no matter how short, how direct, how simple, must fill some moment of time. This, then, is the pretended uniqueness of direct encounter. And we will discover that this true uniqueness which is sameness in diversity, permanence in change, is the real, the real real (if we may so speak), and that this real is not destroyed when I say "this book" (*i. e.* supposing the real, in the first place, to have been "this pencil").

(6.) Again, we shall see that Bradley is laboring under a false understanding of uniqueness when he says that, having attained to the truth that the idea "this" is inseparably united with reality, analytic judgments seem thus secured. Here, again, he is confusing the true and false notions of uniqueness. What Bradley means is, that having attained to this simplicity of direct encounter, from which has been taken all that belongs to character or content, you can pronounce an analytic judgment, because the subject is simple. We would reply, that were it possible for the

subject to be unique, in Bradley's sense of that term, any judgment would be impossible. The subject is nothing, and you can *say* nothing of nothing. But, in truth, if the subject is unique, in the real sense of unique, then, indeed, you can judge, and you may call the judgment analytic only because, be it noticed, the subject is not simple, but complex—*i. e.*, because there has been a previous synthesis. We are inclined to think, in conclusion, that Bradley has fallen into his own snare; that while he has been vigorously combating the theory that the real is momentary presentation, he has himself given way to the same theory. His mistake seems to have been in not recognizing that the reality to which the ideal content is referred—to be a reality at all for us—must be a reality for our *consciousness*, *i. e.*, a thought reality. This thought reality has nothing much to do with that endless discussion about sensation, or direct encounter, or immediate contact, concerning which so much is continually said and written. It is a thought reality because it is the real for us as conscious beings. This would have been secured if Bradley had been willing to admit that everything that *exists* for us exists for us through and because of our consciousness; and therefore sensation is sensation because we are conscious beings.

Only one other thing remains to be considered. That is, the nature of the connection between analytic and synthetic judgments. Reality we now understand to be a thought reality—and presentation is now not fleeting sensation, but a *thought* feeling. The object is no longer independent of, but within and dependent on, consciousness. The object, we may say, is "this." "This," we now know, has two aspects—*viz.*: "thisness," the universal aspect, and "this," the particular aspect. These are mutually complementary and reciprocal. They are correlative. The universal, taken by itself, is perfectly empty, and the particular, taken by itself, vanishes. Both are abstractions: the former like a geometrical surface, only length and breadth without thickness; the latter like a geometrical point, without parts or magnitude. These aspects are not found existing as separate entities in the real world, but are only discovered by an analysis of the real. "This," then, is the real. How do we pass from the real "this," which is now presented, to the real "that," not now presented? How do analytic judgments become synthetic? Here again we are dealing

only with abstractions. The analytic judgment, taken *per se*, is absolutely nothing, and the synthetic judgment, taken by itself, is likewise nothing. When we say "this" (if we mean what we say) we also say "that." We are unable to mean "it" unless we at the same time mean "others," which are not "it." The real object, apart from other real objects, is a phantom. The real is not simply related. Indeed, we are bordering upon a fatal theory if we say the real is related, for we may mean that the real exists apart from relations, and may or may not be related according to the will of the subject. The real is not then related, but relative—*i. e.*, apart from its relations it does not exist at all. "Others" are as essential to the "it" as the "it" is to the others. When we look upon the "it" as independent, we may produce what we call an analytic judgment. But in reality both judgments are at once both analytic and synthetic. The relation, further, of "others" to the "it" is perfectly on a level with the relation of the "it" to the others. Both relations are out of time. One does not precede or follow the other. As a consequence, a synthetic judgment refers as directly to the real as an analytic judgment. When Bradley, therefore, distinguishes between them by saying that the latter refers to a reality directly, but the former indirectly, he makes the mistake of supposing that the relation of "others" to "it" follows, somehow, the relation of "it" to the "others"; for he says that what is not presented must be, first of all, related to the presented, and then judgment follows. In some strange way, he gives us to understand every judgment is at first, for no matter how small a moment, analytic merely, and then afterward it may become anything. Finally, we may say that all these distinctions rest upon the fallacy that reality rests mainly for its reality not upon thought, but upon presentation. Bradley does not, it is probable, and would not, it is certain, ignore thought entirely; but, at any rate, many of his expressions and distinctions tend to place it in a subordinate position.

We might also say that § 32 (ii) might fairly be interpreted as follows: We transcend the given when we pass from analytic to synthetic judgments (given equals sensible present only). But this transcending the given is based upon an inference—some such inference as that the not-given is the same in essence as the given. Inference is nothing but assumption, and inference, finally, as a

result, takes us away from reality. Surely it has that tendency at least which is nothing but the same old fallacy that the "given" is the main thing. If the "given" is anything more than mere sense presentation, if the given is within consciousness, then it is no vast assumption to assert that if the not-given were given it would be the same essentially as the given, *i. e.*, it would only be for and in consciousness. Such an assumption turns out to be no assumption at all. It is, in fact, only asserting that self-consciousness is and always will be self-consciousness. If the "given" is, *e. g.*, red, that does not make self-consciousness in its essence red, and if the not-given should turn out green when, wonderful catastrophe! we expected *it* also to be red, that will not make self-consciousness green and thereby destroy it *in toto*; that would *not* be making self-consciousness two entirely different things. Yet it seems to me, when Bradley talks of inferences and enormous assumptions, his words tend just to such absurdities as we have been describing, and all this, we repeat, rests upon the fact that while the "given" (properly understood) is worthy of consideration, yet, when magnified, it becomes improperly understood, and gives rise to absolute fallacies.

d. We now come to the fourth topic for consideration, viz , Negative Judgments. Bradley's theory is stated in the opening section of Chapter III. "In the end the negative judgment consists in the declared refusal of the subject to accept an ideal content. The suggestion of the real as qualified and determined in a certain way and the exclusion of that suggestion by its application to actual reality are the proper essence of the negative judgment." It would seem from this that Bradley had failed to distinguish between "negation" and "denial" or "refusal." Our subject is the negative judgment, but Bradley talks as if every negative judgment must be an "explicit denial," a "declared refusal." If "negation" and "denial" are synonymous terms, then Bradley is correct, for, in order to there being a denial, there must have been something previously asserted. To deny is to say "No" to something to which the answer "Yes" had previously been given. If there has been no assertion expressed or understood, there cannot possibly be a denial—there would be nothing to deny. Therefore Bradley is correct. But "denial" and simple "negation" are two very different things. Denial must of necessity be ex-

PLICIT. Negation, on the other hand, is only the opposite of affirmation—the complement of it, if we may so speak, *i. e.*, when you affirm, you likewise deny. The very fact that Bradley, it may be inadvertently, calls a negation a denial, shows that he sets out with the preconception that denial is equal to affirmation and a succeeding negation, while, in truth, the denial is but the expression of the negation implicit in all judgment—implicit in the affirmation. Bradley, to put the mistake in one way, confuses implicit negation with explicit denial. To put the mistake in another way, he would say that while affirmation was not in time, negation was in time. Denial *followed* as a *consequence* upon "affirmation," or "suggestion," or "suggested relation," or "failure to relate," for all these expressions are used by Bradley. This last manner of putting his mistake may show us the bottom of the difficulty. Affirmation is not in time, but denial is. This means, when expanded, the old error, that the ultimately real is the inexpressible, *i. e.*, the ultimately real is beyond relations—it has no diversity within itself, but is all one. The real is simple and self-complete. If the real has no relations, it has, of course, no temporal relations. We have already shown the fallacy of this theory. Sameness without difference is nothing. For an object to be the same, it must be the same in contrast with the changing. If there is no change, then also there is no sameness. One by itself kills the other by itself. Only in their conjunction is there life. Mere sameness is, however, just the phantom which, for no matter how short or how long a time, Bradley would tell us, lives alone. Difference follows, and from this springs the negation. But we may go into some of the particulars of the theory, and in so doing fall in line, as far as possible, with Bradley's expressions.

I see a green tree = the fact x . I have the idea "greenness" = $a-b$. I may at once attribute $a-b$ to x . So far Bradley is correct. Again you cannot deny $a-b$ of x so long as you have merely $a-b$ and x . Bradley is still correct. But here he does not go quite far enough. We could not deny $a-b$ of x under any circumstances. Bradley says you can deny $a-b$ of x when you have x ($a-b$). This is not so. Even if you had all the letters of the alphabet multiplied together, you could not deny $a-b$ of x . For, be it noted, x = the green tree, and $a-b$ = the idea of "greenness"; so that to deny "greenness" of the green tree is to speak

falsely, and one needs no idea coupled with any fact to do that. Bradley makes this mistake. He fails to see that in affirming $a-b$ of x we have already denied $c-d$ of x (which $c-d$ may be any other color, but is not defined except as that which is not green). But "not-green" is clearly a negative, and therefore we have a negation in our affirmation. But Bradley answers (and he would seem to rest his case upon the argument he here makes), "When we point to a tree and apply the word 'green,' it may be urged that the subject is just as ideal as when the same object rejects the offered suggestion 'yellow.' But this would ignore an important difference. The tree, in its presented unity with reality, can accept at once the suggested quality. I am not always forced to suspend my decision, to wait and consider the whole as ideal, to ask, in the first place; Is the tree green? and then decide that the tree is a green tree. But, in the negative judgment where 'yellow' is denied, the positive relation of 'yellow' to the tree must precede the exclusion of that relation. The judgment can never anticipate the question. I must always be placed at that stage of reflection which sometimes I avoid in affirmative judgment" (p. 110). What Bradley means by the above is that "the tree is not yellow" involves the previous judgment, "The tree is green." "Surely," he might say, "no one would argue that the judgment 'The tree is not yellow' is involved in and coincident with the judgment 'The tree is green.' No one will say that when I know that the tree is green I at the same time must of necessity know that the tree is not yellow. It is barely possible that I may not know that yellow is a color." And Bradley is assuredly correct. But he has not touched the point at issue. We do not say that calling a tree green is only another way of denying that it is yellow. Far from it. What we do say is, that affirming "greenness" of the tree is precisely the same as denying what is not-green of the same tree. But denying the not-green of the tree is not the same with denying the yellow. This is the difference. Not-green is not equivalent to yellow: not-green includes yellow thus (to put it into the form of a syllogism):

The tree is not not-green ;

Not-green is yellow, black, red, etc. ;

The tree is not yellow, black, red, etc. ;

so that Bradley is right when he says that denying yellow of a green tree rests upon an affirmation. But this affirmation (Not-green is yellow, black, etc.) is a result of further reflection. We do not deny yellow of the tree when we say "The tree is green"; we simply deny that the colors which are not green are to be found in the tree. Bradley might once more object that not-green is not a negative but an affirmative. It is true that in one of its aspects it is undoubtedly an affirmative, but in another aspect it is indisputably negative. More than that, it is true that the negative aspect is the most prominent. Looked at in relation to itself alone, it is positive. Looked at in relation to green, and it is decidedly negative. It is just this double aspect which Bradley refuses to see, and this refusal vitiates his theory.

The above seems a sufficient reply to all the objections which Bradley raises to the theory that affirmation and negation are but two aspects of the one whole. Affirmation and negation are not the same thing; they are not identical. Taken separately, they are directly opposed. But, taken *per se*, each is an abstraction which has no existence in reality. Pure affirmation and pure negation would in a measure correspond to Aristotle's matter and form, which are correlative terms. Already we have shown that Bradley, in his account of "thisness" and "this," laid himself open to the objection that the real was that which excluded all differences—a sort of unformed chaos. The expression of this real, if that were possible, would be pure affirmation. But this theory cannot be upheld.

But, again, it may be seen that Bradley is himself not clear concerning the exact nature of the positive relation which, he maintains, temporarily precedes the denial. He says: "But, in the negative judgment where 'yellow' is denied, *the positive relation of yellow to the tree* must precede the exclusion of that relation." What does this mean? Just this: that a relation excludes itself. First of all you relate "yellow" to the tree, and then, *after doing so*, you find it will not relate, or else that you cannot relate it. After relating, you discover that relation is impossible. When you say "The tree is green," what is done? This: the ideal content "greenness" is affirmed of the reality "tree." But Bradley maintains that before you can say "The tree is not yellow" you have already related the ideal content "yellowness" to the tree. If,

then, relating an ideal content to reality is the essence of judgment, we have, before we can judge "The tree is not yellow," plainly judged, "The tree is yellow." Granting that this is correct, although it would at once occur to any one that it was certainly a round-about process to reach a negative judgment, when finally you do say "The tree is not yellow," why do you do so? The answer is plain, "Yellow is not green; the relation 'green' excludes the relation 'yellow.'" Bradley himself almost admits as much when he says "The basis of negation is really the assertion of a quality that excludes." Here he has somewhat abandoned his former position. Now he would say that the basis of the judgment, "The tree is yellow," is not the assertion "The tree is yellow," as was said above, but "The tree is green." This admission takes Bradley a considerable way toward a more correct theory. It is equivalent to asserting that only the following steps are necessary to be taken in order to reach a negative judgment :

The tree is green ;
 Yellow is not green ;
 The tree is not yellow.

This can only mean that an explicit denial rests on both affirmation and negation, and on both equally. It cannot mean that a negative judgment rests upon an affirmative judgment. The negative judgment (the conclusion) rests on both a positive and a negative assertion (both the premisses). But to say that a negative judgment, notice, rests on a negative judgment, as Bradley finally does, is absurd, for that statement at once commits him to the fallacy of an infinite series. Besides all this, when he writes that "The basis of negation is really the *assertion of a quality that excludes*," he has made a statement that is tantamount to admitting the theory against which he has been contending. Here it is admitted that "green" is not simply a quality, but it is a *quality that excludes*. This means that while green has a positive aspect (it is a quality) it has also a negative aspect (it excludes). If green has a positive and negative aspect, the judgment, "The tree is green," is at once a positive and negative judgment. When that is seen, with it is likewise seen the folly of splitting judgments into positive and negative, when every judgment must be at once positive and negative. The truth is that Bradley saw, but would not ac-

knowledge that he saw, that negation is implied in any affirmation. This accounts for the long dispute which he found it necessary to have with the "logical negation." He admits that the "logical negation" is on a level with affirmation, but maintains that logical negation is not denial. If denial means articulating the word "not" or "no," then Bradley is right, but he protests against being drawn into metaphysical subtleties. However poor and meagre a logical negation is, it is still a negation, and as such is, when expressed, a negative judgment.

To conclude the argument with a simple illustration. I see a book and pronounce it red. Now, red is the only color explicitly noticed. When I say "The book is red," I at once exclude the relation of all other colors to the book. If "the book is red" is a true judgment, then the book is no other color. Some one now asks, "Is the book yellow?" We answer, "No; yellow is already excluded; it was said that red excluded all other colors, of which yellow is one." Surely if I am asked whether a red book is yellow, I do not refer yellow to the book, and then deny the reference. Any child would answer, "No, it is not yellow because it is red," and that answer certainly implies the truth that in the judgment "The book is red" we have both affirmation and negation. Expanded, the answer would read:

It is red, *i. e.*, it is no other color;

Yellow is another color;

It is not yellow.

This shows that the conclusion "It is not yellow" rests upon the first premise, with one foot upon its positive aspect, "It is red," and with the other foot upon its negative aspect, "It is no other color."

There are several interesting points in the foregoing discussion which might be dwelt upon with profit, but they will be only indicated here. First, Bradley is quite unsettled as to what is exactly the basis of a negative judgment. "We pronounce a certain quality as not belonging to a certain object," he says, first of all, "after the *positive relation* of the quality to the object" (p. 110). In another place he seems to think that the above language was a little strong, and so says: "It is only true that, as a condition of denial, we must have already a *suggested synthesis*." Suggestion has here taken the place of positive relation. Again: "The basis

of our first denial is to be found in the *failure to refer* an idea to a perception. Here we have neither a positive relation nor a suggestion, but a failure to refer—*i. e.*, merely an attempted relation or suggestion. It is not required to reopen the argument. Suffice it to say that there is a marked difference of meaning in these three expressions. They serve to show that for Bradley the basis of the negation was being shifted. The weakness to which this fluctuation points has already been noticed.

In the second place, the last expression—*i. e.*, “failure to refer”—affords an opportunity of learning Bradley’s estimate of the value of a negative judgment. It would seem from this that he accords it but a very secondary position. A negative judgment is only used when you fail to make a positive judgment, or at least it is in some sense a failure. This intimates that there is in the affirmation something of superiority. It is true, without doubt, that a positive statement is, as a rule, more definite than a negative statement. If A could only be C or D, then the negative judgment, “A is not D,” would be equally instructive with the positive judgment “A is C.” Commonly, however, we have many more possible predicates than two. But value as regards information and logical value are very different matters. From a logical point of view there is no difference in value between an affirmative and a negative statement, for each implies the other. Bradley’s view, as has been already shown, leaves the way open to the theory that nature has a ground-plan of pure positiveness. If so, we have again fallen in with the unknowable or substrate.

While Bradley, in dealing with negative judgments, had left the nature of the connection between positive and negative almost wholly undefined, he reveals his true theory more fully when he speaks of Negative Reasoning. There he holds that while in affirmative assertions you may make use of all the categories, in the negative assertions you can only make use of the category of Subject and Attribute. That is as much as saying that things are essentially positive, and that only into one portion of the positive can the negative be introduced. When we bear in mind that when we define we likewise limit, the conclusion is forced upon us that the positive sphere is for Bradley the undefinable and inexpressible. If so, it should have been utterly banished, but Bradley still holds stubbornly to its existence.